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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The 1977-1978 term produced a number of significant decisions in the field of local government law. In addition to the
usual assortment of cases from the courts of appeal involving
tort liability,' public contracts,2 public employment, 3 zoning,,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., Gallien v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1127 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978) (drainage district liable for damages
caused by defective property only if it had actual or constructive notice of the defect);
Falgout v. St. Charles Sewerage Dist. No. 3, 351 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1978) (where property is damaged as a result of a
backup of sewerage into property owner's home, sewerage district's liability is absolute); London v. Ryan, 349 So. 2d 1334 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d
171 (La. 1977) (city-liable for unintentional shooting of bystander by city police officers); Umbehagen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 So. 2d 1209 (La. 1977) (city not liable for damages sustained at an intersection at which city police were directing traffic because officers were not negligent);
D'Amico v. NOPSI, 348 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1214
(La. 1977) (city liable for damages to French Quarter building when damages resulted
from vibrations caused by city buses).
2. See, e.g., Foti v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 358 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978) (school board may not act unreasonably in rejecting the only bid submitted on
property it has offered for sale); Bunkie Bank & Trust Co. v. Avoyelles Parish Police
Jury, 358 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (in awarding a fiscal agency contract,
police jury can consider the expenses that may be incurred in transporting funds to
and from the selected bank); Di Vencente Bros. Inc. v. Livingston Parish School Bd.,
355 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 558 (La. 1978) (school
board need neither follow public bid statute for school lunch program purchases nor
accept the lowest bid for a particular item); Martin v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 349 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (district's contract with private
corporation to manage and direct the Superdome was invalid under the public bid laws
but was ratified by a constitutional act of the state legislature); Lafourche Parish
Water Dist. No. 1 v. Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc., 346 So. 2d 769, (La. App. 1st Cir.) cert.
denied, 349 So. 2d 873 (La. 1977) (water district's board of commissioners has power
to enter into an exclusive contract for engineering services even though the contract
could conceivably extend beyond the tenure of the individual commissioners).
3. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Guste, 355 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 1323 (La. 1978) (parish school board not required to give
employees elected to parish police jury leaves of absences to attend police jury meetings); Ryder v. Pineville Civil Serv. Bd., 351 So. 2d 299 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (city
allowed to abolish position of deputy fire chief and demote deputy to assistant fire chief
when action was part of a general austerity program that was initiated in good faith
and for just cause); Municipal Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Myers, 348 So. 2d 1334 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1977) (requirement that some but not all municipal employees reside in the
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local option elections,' and other matters, the supreme court
rendered important decisions concerning local laws, 7 overlapping state law and local ordinances,8 municipal annexations,,
city does not violate equal protection guarantees of state and federal constitutions);
Lemoine v. Department of Police, 348 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (dismissal
of police officer for failure to answer job related questions upheld when he had been
advised that no statements he made would be used against him in criminal prosecution). See also State v. Smith, 357 So. 2d 505 (La. 1978) (employee of private corporation administering anti-poverty programs is not an employee of the parish or state
under malfeasance-in-office statute).
4. See, e.g., Trustees v. Town of West Lake, 357 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 205 (La. 1978) (rezoning ordered when existing zoning of
property did not conform to that of surrounding area and was apparently based on
neighbors' desire that property remain vacant); Trapani v. City of Kenner, 357 So. 2d
910 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1978) (rezoning ordered when
original zoning was six grades more restrictive than the classification recommended by
the city's own expert); Konrad v. Parish of Jefferson, 352 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 121 (La. 1978) (rezoning ordered when land was unsuitable for use under existing zoning classification).
5. See, e.g., Mikkelsen v. City of DeRidder, 357 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978)
(when electorate in a local option election banned sale of alcoholic beverages, city
could ban their manufacture and distribution as well); Niette v. City of Natchitoches,
348 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977) (local option
election invalid because it excluded an incorporated municipality and was not, therefore, a ward-wide election as required by the state statute); Ward v. West Carroll
Parish Police Jury, 347 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 154 (La.
1977) (calling of separate ward-wide elections in each of the parish's five wards did not
amount to the calling of a parish-wide election). See also State v. Twiner, :350 So. 2d
608 (La. 1977) (legality of local option election was conclusively presumed after expiration of 30-day period to bring suit challenging the election).
6. See, e.g., Seghers v. Community Advancement, Inc., 357 So. 2d 626 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978) (private corporation administering anti-poverty programs was an
"authority" as that term is used in the open meetings law); Javers v. City Council of
New Orleans, 351 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 200 (La.
1978) (city not required to conduct a referendum on a proposed ordinance that was
patently unconstitutional).
7. State v. LaBauve, 359 So. 2d 181 (La. 1978); Davenport v. Hardy, 349 So. 2d
858 (La. 1977). See notes 13-38, infra, and accompanying text.
8. City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978); City of Shreveport v.
Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995 (La. 1977). See notes 39-89, infra, and accompanying text.
See also City of New Orleans v. Edwards, 349 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977)
(statute changing date for New Orleans elections did not violate constitutional provisions regarding home rule).
9. Kansas City So. Ry. v. City of Shreveport, 354 So. 2d 1362 (La.), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 103 (1978). See notes 90-121, infra, and accompanying text.
10. Fontenot v. State Dep't of Highways, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978), rev'g, 346
So. 2d 849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (see note 123, infra); Foster v. Hampton, 352 So.
2d 197 (La. 1977). See notes 122-71, infra, and accompanying text. See also Frank v.
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tort liability of local governments, 0 and paving assessments."
Space constraints require a limitation of coverage to the supreme court decisions, and a recent case note has analyzed the
paving assessment decision in detail. 2 Therefore, this article

will focus on the supreme court decisions in the remaining four
areas.
LOCAL LAWS

The 1974 constitution 3 continues Louisiana's tradition" of
restricting the legislature's authority to pass local or special
laws." Article III contains a list of ten matters that the legislature may not regulate by local act;16 on all other matters the
Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1978) (sheriff not liable for injury caused by prisoner who
was allowed to leave the parish jail); Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969 (La.
1977) (city liable for damages resulting from use of excess force by police officers).
11. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977) (when local
governing body made statutorily required findings with respect to a paving assessment,
assessment ordinance was valid even though the governing body did not receive expert
evidence prior to making its findings). The First Circuit also decided a paving assessment case of some significance. Pierson v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 353 So. 2d 726
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
905 (1978) (parish must levy equal assessments on all property owners who benefit from
a work let by a single contract even if some property owners were benefited more than
others).
12. Note, Special Problems of InterpretationArising Out of Procedurefor Levying Special Assessments, 38 LA. L. REv. 1073 (1978).
13. LA. CONST. art. IN, §§ 12, 13; LA. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
14. See LA. CONST. of 1921 art. IV, §§ 4-6.
15. Judicial decisions have occasionally, but not consistently, distinguished between local and special acts. When the supreme court has recognized the distinction,
it has used the following definitions:
A "local" law is one that operates only in a particular locality without the
possibility of extending its coverage to other areas should the requisite criteria
of its statutory classification exist there. A statute is "special" if it affects only
a certain number of persons within a class and not all persons possessing the
characteristics of the class.
State ex rel. Miller v. Henderson, 329 So. 2d 707, 710 (La. 1976). See also Teachers'
Retirement System v. Vial, 317 So. 2d 179, 182 n.12 (La. 1975). The recent cases
distinguishing between local and special laws appear to respond to scholarly criticism
of the court's failure to do so in the past. See The Work of the LouisianaAppellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Legislative Process, 36 LA. L. REV. 549 (1976); Comment, General and Special Laws in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv. 768, 770 (1956). Both
cases discussed in this section considered challenges that statutes were local laws, and
the term local law is, therefore, used exclusively in the remainder of the section.
16. LA. CONST. art. II, § 12. The 1845 constitution contained the first list of
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legislature may enact local legislation, but only if the bill proposing the laws is publicized in the areas concerned prior to its
introduction in the legislature. 7
A chief difficulty in applying the predecessor constitutional provisions has involved distinguishing local acts from
general laws to which the constitutional provisions are inapplicable. Like courts in other states with prohibitions against
local laws, 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a law
may be a general law even though it applies in a single locality
if the legislation is based on a reasonable classification. 9 Most
other states have insisted that the class created by such legislation be an "open" one; that is, they have required that other
localities be afforded the opportunity to join the class if they

satisfy the criteria on which the class is based. 0 In Louisiana,
subjects on which local or special laws were prohibited. LA. CONST. of 1845 art. 117.
17. LA. CONST. art. III, § 13. The publication requirement originated in the
constitution of 1879. LA. CONST. of 1879 art. 48.
18. See, e.g., Lovel v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387
(1959); DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill. 2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954); Omaha Parking Auth.
v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956); Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia,
77 Pa. 338, 349-50 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1875); Devon v. City of San Antonio, 443 S.W.2d 598
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969). According to one commentator who surveyed state statutes
around 1960, only four states-Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire-lacked "some constitutional provisions either restricting the use of special legislation or expressing a need for general legislation." J. WINTERS, STATE CONSTITTIONAL LIMrrATIONS

85 (1961). For an earlier survey of state legislation, see Comment,

supra note 15, at 768-69.
19. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Henderson, 329 So. 2d 707, 711 (La. 1976);
Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 116, 68 So. 2d 774, 778
(1954); State v. Housing Auth., 190 La. 710, 737, 182 So. 725, 734 (1938). But see
Federal Land Bank v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enterprises, 166 La. 566, 572, 117 So. 720, 722
(1928), where the court held that a statute applicable only to municipalities with a
population over 100,000 was a local law because only New Orleans was in the class and
there were no "prospects that the state would have in the immediate future other
municipalities containing such a population."
20. See, e.g., Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Comm., 40 Cal. 2d 91, 251 P.2d
321 (1952); Batistich v. Brennan, 45 N.J. 533, 213 A.2d 761 (1965); City of Ft. Worth
v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 41 S.W.2d 228 (1931). See generally Winters, Classificationof
Municipalities, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 279, 287 (1962). See also State v. O'Hara, 36 La. Ann.
93 (1884), where the court stated:
It does not say or mean that persons pursuing the business in New Orleans
shall pay $1000, and in other cities or towns within the State $500, although it
may be that it does actually operate in that manner; but it must be remembered
that laws are not passed to live a short life, and that it is not a mere possibility
that towns now counting a population less than 25,000 souls may not labentibus
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however, the supreme court has, without discussing the classification requirement, sustained what appears to be an extreme
example of a closed class-an act's covering only enumerated
localities-on the ground that the legislature had a reasonable
basis for limiting the statute to the specified areas."'
State v. LaBauve2 is the supreme court's most recent attempt to distinguish local and general laws. LaBauve concerned a statute establishing criminal penalties for using gill
nets to fish in portions of Lafourche and Terrebonne parishes,
and the court held that the statute violated the constitutional
prohibition against passing local or special laws "[diefining
any crime.""
The court began its analysis of the statute by noting that,
"[o]n its face, the [gill net act] is a local statute which (for
no shown reason) applies only to portions of Lafourche and
Terrebonne parishes."'" According to the court, this limitation
was sufficient to invalidate the law under prior decisions; 5 and
in any event, the debates of the 1973 constitutional convention
reflected the delegates' belief that limiting the use of gill nets
in specific parishes would violate the constitutional ban."8
In explaining its holding, the court noted that any law that
applies only in certain parishes is "suspect as a local law,"
although not every law whose operation is limited to specific
localities is invalid. If the law applies in certain localities
"solely through the effect of a reasonable general classification
annis, fortune and prosperity smiling on them, become large and populous cities, casting umbrage on the present great metropolis of the State.
36 La. Ann. at 96.
21. See, e.g., Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage Dist., 224 La. 105, 68 So.
2d 774 (1953); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 209 La. 737, 25 So. 2d
527 (1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). In practice, the Louisiana decisions seem to reach
results similar to those of states that prohibit local laws when a general law is or can
be made applicable. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
22. 359 So. 2d 181 (La. 1978).
23. LA. CONST. art. El, § 12(10).
24. 359 So. 2d at 183.
25. Id., citing State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938). Clement invalidated a statute prohibiting trapping in marshlands within 150 miles of the Gulf of
Mexico.
26. 359 So. 2d at 183, citing STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRiPrs, Jan. 8, 1974, at 25-29.
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(such as population size or physical characteristics)," 7 the law
is general rather than local. On the other hand, if the limitation
of the act's coverage occurs "solely by its specific designation
of certain parishes, " the act is a local law covered by the
constitutional provisions.
The result in LaBauve is unexceptional because it is consistent with the supreme court's prior decisions rejecting statutes imposing arbitrary geographic limits.29 Nonetheless, at
first glance, the opinion appears to presage a change in Louisiana law. In several places, the court used language indicating
that, to avoid the constitutional provisions concerning local
legislation, the legislature must legislate by open classification
rather than by the enumeration of specific localities to which
the law will apply," and the citation of a treatise supporting
the open classification requirement reinforces that impression.3 However, Davenport v. Hardy2 counsels against any
such interpretation of LaBauve. In Davenport, which preceded
LaBauve by nine months and was cited with apparent approval
in LaBauve,1 the court held that a statute which regulated the
terms of the constables in two New Orleans city courts was not
local legislation.3 ' Since the Davenport statute specified the
27. 359 So. 2d at 183.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938). See also note 25,
supra.
30. In addition to the language quoted in the text, the court said:
[T]he factor which makes a statute special or local is that it operates in one
locality without the possibility of extending its coverage to other areas should
the requisite criteria of its statutory classification exist there or that it affects
only a certain number of persons within a class and not all persons possessing
the characteristics of the class . . . . [The LaBauve statute] does not fall
within the rule that a statute is not local, even though truly applicable to only
one locality, if it is generalin its terms and its coverage can extend to other areas
should the requisite criteria exist there as well.
359 So. 2d at 182-83 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 183, citing J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
40.02, 40.06 (Sands ed. 1973).
32. 349 So. 2d 858 (La. 1977). Cf. Sapir v. Hardy, 349 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 So. 2d 867 (La. 1977) (statute regulating the term of New
Orleans district attorney is a general law).
33. 359 So. 2d at 182.
34. The plaintiff in Davenport argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional ban against local laws "(flor the holding and
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courts to which it applied,35 it would not have satisfied the
dictum in LaBauve suggesting that the legislature must act by
classification rather than by enumeration.
Like LaBauve, Davenport affirmed that a law "is not local
or special, even though its enforcement may be restricted to a
particular locality, simply because the conditions under which
it operates do not prevail in every locality."3 6 But Davenport
failed to incorporate the LaBauve language that the legislature
must act by open classification rather than by enumeration;
relying on several prior decisions that had upheld statutes as
general laws even though they applied to specifically named
local governmental entities, the Davenport opinion focused on
whether the limitation of the Act's coverage to the New Orleans
courts was reasonable and concluded that it was.37
The cumulative effect of LaBauve and Davenport is to
make no significant change in Louisiana law. The supreme
court continues to recognize that a law applicable only in a
limited area is general if its coverage is defined by the operation
of a reasonable classification scheme. When considering statutes that expressly limit their applicability to a single local
government or small group of local governments, the court is
more suspicious; nonetheless, such statutes may also be classified as general laws if the court concludes that the legislature's
decision to limit the Act's coverage by enumeration was a reasonable one. It is difficult to follow the logic leading to the
conclusion that a law applicable only to a specifically named
conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting." 349 So. 2d at 863.
An intervenor contended that the statute was invalid because the legislature failed to
comply with the publication requirements applicable to permissible local laws. Because the court concluded that the statute was a general law, it did not determine if
it fell within the list of subjects for which local laws are prohibited or if the publication
requirements had been followed.
35. See LA. R.S. 56:409 (Supp. 1974).
36. 349 So. 2d at 863.
37. Id. at 864. The court stated:
In the instant suit, although the constables of the First and Second City
Courts are elected by voters from a limited area, they serve the community as
a whole and not a certain number of persons within a class. The act does not
give private advantage for the benefit of persons within a certain locality, but
on the contrary it affects generally all persons who may have contact with the
First and Second City court.
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locality is not a local law, but the anomaly is one that Louisiana law has found tolerable for many years. In any event, the
court's chief concern in all the cases appears to be one of reasonableness: it upholds the statute only if it concludes that the
legislature adopted a means to limit the law's reach that was
reasonable in light of the problem it was addressing28
OVERLAPPING WITH STATE LAWS AND LOCAL ORDINANCES

Under the 1921 constitution, Louisiana law normally recognized the supremacy of state law over local ordinances. Although special rules applied to certain local governments with
home rule charters, 3 the general rule invalidated a local ordinance if it conflicted with or was inconsistent with the state
constitution or with a general state law.40 In applying this limitation on local power, Louisiana courts distinguished conflicts
38. Id. LaBauve and Davenport can certainly be reconciled on this ground. The
LaBauve enumeration was unreasonable because it covered only a portion of an area
with essentially similar topography. 359 So. 2d at 183 n.3. On the other hand, the
restrictive statute in Davenport addressed a problem peculiar to the New Orleans
courts, indeed, its "obvious purpose" in adjusting the terms of the New Orleans constables was to make their terms uniform with the terms of other constables in the state.
349 So. 2d at 860. See State v. Dalon, 35 La. Ann. 1141 (1883), where it was stated:
The argument, that a law which relates solely to the machinery of a court of
justice having jurisdiction over the territory of one parish only, is a local or
special law, because it does not operate throughout the State and all the parishes thereof, is perfectly preposterous, and so hollow that it cannot stand criticism.
35 La. Ann. at 1143-44.
39. See LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIV, § 3(a) (1946) (East Baton Rouge Parish);
LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIV, § 3(c) (1956) (Jefferson Parish). Under the home rule
charters for East Baton Rouge and Jefferson parishes, local ordinances prevailed over
contrary state laws with respect to "the structure, organization and particular distributions . . . of. . . powers and functions" within the parish. LA. CONST. of 1921, art.
XIV, § 3(a)(2) (1946); LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIV, § 3(c)(2) (1956). See generally
Letellier v. Jefferson Parish, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969); Ware v. Cannon, 248
So. 2d 19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); LaFleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1960). A 1974 decision of the supreme court refused to apply a similar
limitation on state power for 'other home rule governments under the 1921 constitution.
Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974).
40. No single source imposed this rule on all local governments. Except for the
special home rule charters cited in note 39, supra, this general rule proceeded from
several sources. See, e.g., LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIV, § 22 (1950) (city of New Orleans); LA. CONST. of 1921 art. XIV, § 40(d) (municipalities); Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974) (city of Shreveport).
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and inconsistencies. A conflict existed when a local ordinance
contravened the express provisions of the constitution or a state
statute.4 An inconsistency between a state law and a local
ordinance occurred when the court perceived an implied conflict or a state intent to preempt the field. If the local ordinance
interfered with the spirit of the constitution or statute without
contradicting a specific provision, the courts found an implied
conflict." If the state legislation convinced the court that the
legislature intended to withhold the power to act on the subject, the court found that the legislative action preempted any
local attempts to-govern the field.'
The 1974 constitution significantly alters this framework.
Article VI recognizes three types of local governments: existing
home rule governments-those with home rule charters in existence on the date that the constitution was adopted;" new
41. State ex. rel. Sutton v. Caidwell, 195 La. 507, 197 So. 214 (1940). The court
stated: "A municipality cannot permit by ordinance what a statute forbids, or forbid
what a statute expressly permits, but it may supplement a statute or cover any part
of an authorized field of local legislation that is not covered by state legislation." Id.
at 518, 197 So. at 217-18.
42. National Food Stores of La., Inc. v. Cefalu, 280 So. 2d 903 (La. 1973). Cf.
City of Minden v. David Bros. Drug Co., 195 La. 791, 800, 197 So. 505, 508 (1940) ("It
is fundamental that a municipality can not adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit
of state law, or are repugnant to the general policy of the State.").
43. See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. LaCombe, 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952)
(state statute did not authorize municipality to enact an ordinance forbidding gambling that was not conducted as a business). The court stated:
We conclude that when the Legislature in its latest enactment removed from a
municipality the power which it had previously given to it to define gambling
and itself passed a law specifically defining it, it intended to occupy the whole
field of legislation on the subject and merely left the municipality with the
concurrent power to suppress it in the manner as defined by that law.
Id. at 630, 57 So. 2d at 210 (emphasis added). See also City of Pineville v. Tarver, 231
La. 446, 91 So. 2d 597 (1956) (state local option statute did not authorize city to enact
an ordinance forbidding the possession of certain types of alcholic beverages).
In both LaCombe and Tarverthe court held that ordinances conflicted with state
statutes on the same subject matter. In reality, the problem was not that the ordinances conflicted with state law but that they involved action in an area in which the
court perceived a legislative intent to control the entire field. The result reached by
the court was probably correct in both cases, but because of the comprehensive nature
of the statutes in question, the question was one of preemption, not conflict. Cf.
National Food Stores of La., Inc. v. Cefalu, 280 So. 2d 903 (La. 1973) (in finding
implied conflict, court quoted extensively from the comprehensive statutory scheme
enacted by the legislature).
44. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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home rule governments-local governments that adopt home
rule charters after the constitution went into effect;45 and
"[o]ther local governmental subdivisions"-all local governments that do not fall within either of the first two categories."
The new constitution allows new home rule governments to
exercise all powers needed to manage their affairs so long as the
powers are "not denied by general law or inconsistent with this
constitution."' 7 Normally, "[o]ther local governmental subdivisions" are authorized to exercise "the powers authorized by
this constitution or by law,"' a reference that appears to incorporate the earlier rule that governments are creatures of the
state and have only those powers given to them by the legislature.' These "other governments" can, however, broaden the
scope of their powers: if a majority of the voters in the locality
approve, the local governing authority can, "[slubject to and
not inconsistent with this constitution," exercise any power
"not denied by its charter or by general law."5 Finally, the
constitution continues the charters and powers of existing
home rule governments "[e]xcept as inconsistent with this
constitution."'" In addition, the constitution authorizes an existing home rule government, if its charter permits, to exercise
the powers and functions given to "other local governmental
subdivisions," 52 presumably including the right to adopt all
powers that are necessary for the management of its affairs and
"not denied by its charter or by general law." 53
One aim of the new constitutional framework seems to
have been to reduce the number of situations in which state law
45. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
46. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
47. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(E).
48. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A).
49. See, e.g., 7 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973:
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 26, 1973 at 1427-29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
RECORDS]. For a discussion of the state creature theory, see Kean, Local Government
and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REv. 63, 64-65 (1975). Under the state creature theory, all
local laws inconsistent with state laws are invalid. See, e.g., City of Minden v. David
Bros. Drug Co., 195 La. 791, 800, 197 So. 505, 508 (1940).
50. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A).
51.

LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.

52.
53.

Id.
LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A).
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will invalidate local ordinances. 5 For new home rule governments, the rule now is that the exercise of a power by the
locality is invalid only if inconsistent with the constitution or
denied by general law, and other localities can establish a similar rule with respect to any particular power if the local electorate approves. The continuation of the "inconsistent with" language with respect to the 1974 constitution suggests that the
rules as to when the constitution invalidates local ordinances
remain unchanged, but the more restrictive "not denied by"
language used with respect to state statutes apparently manifests a desire to increase the ambit of local authority.
Two recent cases discussed the problem of overlapping
state and local ordinances, although neither decision found it
necessary to explore the meaning of the new "denied by" language in the 1974 constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting gambling in City of
Shreveport v. Kaufman." The basis for the decision was the
state constitutional provision providing that "[glambling
54. The major thrust of the local government article was to eliminate the "state
creature concept" of local governments (see City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615,
194 So. 566 (1940), and note 49, supra,) and to grant local governments broad residual
powers. See City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995, 996-97 (La. 1977); Kean,
supra note 49, at 66. In addition, the home rule article also prohibits the state legislature from changing or affecting "structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions" of any home rule government. LA.
CONST. art. VI, § 6. This language appears to incorporate the protection that Louisiana
courts had previously granted to the home rule governments of the parishes of East
Baton Rouge and Jefferson. See note 39, supra. A later section of the article may,
however, gut the impact of the prohibition of state legislation by specifically covering
the area that has been most significant in the past-pay of police officers and fire
fighters. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 14. Two commentators have argued that, notwithstanding the specific section covering pay matters, the prohibition of state laws affecting the structure and organization of home rule governments protects these governments from state interference in any pay matters. See Kean, supra note 49, at 67-70;
Comment, Exclusive Powers of LouisianaHome Rule Municipalitiesand Parishes,23
Loy. L. REv. 961 (1977). Unfortunately, neither of these commentators documents his
position by reference to the debates in the constitutional convention.
55. 353 So. 2d 995 (La. 1977). Chief Justice Sanders filed a dissenting opinion
that Justice Summers joined. Id. at 998 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting). He concluded that
the constitutional provision relating to gambling was not designed to grant the legislature the exclusive power to define gambling. He also argued that the majority's opinion
required a holding that a municipality could not define gambling even when the
legislature expressly authorized it to do so and that such a holding was untenable in
the light of the constitutional debates. Id. at 999. But see note 74, infra.
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. the legislature."56 The court held that

this provision allows only the legislature to define gambling,"
and since the definition of gambling in the Shreveport ordinance differed from the legislature's definition,5" the local ordinance was inconsistent with the constitution.
City of Shreveport v. Curry5 involved a Shreveport ordinance regulating frog gigging 0 on Cross Lake.6" During the
month of June, the ordinance permitted frog gigging within the
172 foot contour line mean gulf level and, by implication, prohibited it during the rest of the year." The defendants argued
56. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
57. 353 So. 2d at 997.
58. The state statute, LA. R.S. 14:90 (Supp. 1968), proscribes gambling only
when it is conducted as a business. The Shreveport ordinance also prohibited gambling
that would not be classified as a business. 353 So. 2d at 997.
59. 357 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1978). Chief Justice Sanders and Justices Marcus and
Dennis dissented without opinion.
60. The court gave the following definition of frog gigging:
Frog gigging is a method of taking frogs with a mechanical device, an activity
accomplished, pertinent to the case under consideration, while in a boat close
to the shore line. The device is essentially a grabber triggered by a spring lever.
It grabs or "gigs" the frog but does not puncture the frog's skin or redden its
meat.
Id. at 1079 n.1.
61. The Shreveport ordinance (Section 14-19 of the Shreveport City Code) provided:
BE IT FURTHER ORDAINED, That the following recreational activities being
dealt with in this section are fishing, boating, water skiing, hunting and frog
gigging. Each activity mentioned above is subject to regulations as follows:
D. HUNTING
4. Frog gigging will be permitted within the 172 foot contour line mean gulf
level from June 1 through June 30 using only approved mechanical devices and
in accordance with existing State laws. Frog gigging will not be permitted where
it conflicts with the exclusive right to use of property within the 172 foot contour
line mean gulf level by the abutting property owners.
[Any person who shall violate the provisions of this ordinance shall upon
conviction be fined not less than $10.00 nor more than $200.00, or be imprisoned
not less than 10 days, nor more than 60 days, or shall suffer both fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Id. at 1079.
62. The ordinance contained no express prohibition of frog gigging at any time.
Since the court concluded that the ordinance was an invalid exercise of police power,
it found no necessity "to resolve in this instance whether the statute fails to proscribe
the conduct with which these defendants are charged." Id. at 1080.
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that the Shreveport ordinance was invalid because the local
regulation conflicted with a state law that forbade frog gigging
during April and May and apparently permitted it during the
rest of the year and because the state statute manifested an
intent to preempt the field. Citing pre-1974 cases without alluding to the changes made by the 1974 constitution, the court
declared that a municipal ordinance's prohibition is valid only
so long as "it does not forbid what the state legislature has
expressly or implicitly authorized. 6'

3

Since "the Shreveport

ordinance proscribe[d] what the state statute would permit
(frog gigging .

. from January through March, and July

through December),"" the court would have found that "the
area had been preempted by state law" if it had believed that
the purpose of the Shreveport ordinance was "to regulate the
taking of frogs." 5

The court, however, reduced its analysis of the conflict
issue to dictum by treating the Shreveport ordinance as designed to prohibit the activity of frog gigging rather than to
stop the taking of frogs." As so construed, the ordinance did not
conflict with the state law; instead, it raised the question
whether the ordinance was a valid police regulation. The court
held that it was not because it bore no "real and substantial
relationship" to "the prevention of injury to the public or the
63. Id., citing National Food Stores of La., Inc. v. Cefalu, 280 So. 2d 903 (La.
1973); Broussard v. Ketchens, 231 La. 508, 91 So. 2d 775 (1956).
64. 357 So. 2d at 1080. One should note that the state statute, LA. R.S. 56:330
(Supp. 1974), does not expressly provide that frog gigging is permissible from January
to March and July to December. It prohibits frog gigging in April and May and
provides that frogs may be taken during the open season by using certain gigging aids.
The court found a positive legislative authorization for frog gigging implicit in the
statutory scheme. See note 88, infra.
65. 357 So. 2d at 1080.
66. Id. The court gave the following explanation for this conclusion:
We believe . . . that the thrust of the Shreveport ordinance is not to prohibit
the taking of frogs but to prohibit people from operating a frog gig, the apparent
intent of the city being to discourage this type of human activity upon or near
the edge of Cross Lake. We have this belief because the city makes no argument
at all that the ordinance attempts to protect the frog or regulate the proliferation
of frogs, and we can find no logical relationship between frog gigging as regulated
by the ordinance and the life cycle or activity of frogs.
Id. at 1080-81.
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promotion of the general welfare." 7 According to the court, the
"barren record" before it did not demonstrate "[j]ust what
purpose relative to the public health, morals, peace or general
welfare is served by prohibiting frog gigging eleven months
during the year," 8 and the ordinance itself offered no rationale
for the prohibition." Although the city argued that it could
proscribe frog gigging because "the sport

. . .

is done in small

boats at night near the shoreline,"70 this justification did not
convince the court that the Shreveport ordinance was reasonable. The city permitted other recreational activities near the
shoreline at night, and the city failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of prohibiting frog gigging while permitting these
other activities.7 Accordingly, the court held the Shreveport
regulation invalid as an unlawful exercise of the police power.
Neither of these decisions requires extensive discussion
with respect to the merits. A recent case note has considered
Kaufman in detail,7" and Kaufman's basic premise, that a positive grant of power to a legislative body can carry an implicit
denial of that power to subordinate legislative bodies, is not
novel in American law. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution's grant to
67; Id. at 1081.
68. Id. at 1082.
69. Id. The court did note that "the preamble to the ordinance does relate that
one of the purposes of the ordinance is to prevent the commission of nuisances upon
the lake and in the buildings along its shoreline." Id.
70. Id.
71. The court gave the following summary of the other permissible activities:
[T]here is no argument advanced, and we can conceive of none, to differentiate
the nocturnal activity of frog giggers in and around the lake as opposed to the
activity of other boaters and hunters who can permissibly under the ordinance
enjoy their sport at night and near the shoreline under certain conditions. Boating is permitted from daylight to dark every month and to as late as 10:00 p.m.
during some months, without limitations near the shoreline. Fishing is prohibited within one hundred feet of boat houses, but allowed along the shoreline.
Water skiing is permitted on the lake. Hunting is permitted on the lake in
accordance with federal and state laws. No suggestion is made by the city which
demonstrates the reasonableness of prohibiting frog gigging while other recreational activities such as those mentioned above are permitted at nighttime
(until 10 p.m. in some cases) along the shoreline.
Id. at 1082-83.
72. Note, Home Rule and Local Ordinances Defining Gambling, 38 LA. L. REv.
1108 (1978).
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Congress of the power to regulate interstate commerce7 3 implies
an analogous limit on state power to regulate that commerce.74
The Curry decision is similarly unexceptional on the merits.
Since the court explained its holding in terms of Shreveport's
failure to prove the relationship between its ban on frog gigging
and permissible governmental concerns, other localities (or
even Shreveport itself) could successfully defend similar ordinances if they could prove that the public welfare requires the
ban. 5

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decisions is the
court's handling of the conflict and preemption arguments in
Curry. This dictum is troublesome in at least two respects. In
the first place, the court merged the arguments of implied conflict and preemption.76 Although the two arguments are similar
because each urges that a local ordinance is invalid even
though it does not expressly contradict the words of a state
statute, the focus of each argument is quite distinct. Implied
conflict relies on the spirit of the legislation 77 to discover a
legislative intent that the local ordinance has contravened.
Preemption, on the other hand, relies on the pervasive nature
of the state statutory scheme to manifest the legislative intent;
because the state has legislated extensively in the field, the
court infers that the legislature intended for its statute to be
the final word concerning all matters in the general area that
the statute covers. The lack of analytical precision in Curry
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Trans. Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945). Acceptance of the commerce clause analogy would allow the court to avoid
the holding feared by Chief Justice Sanders, that a local ordinance defining gambling
was invalid even when the state legislature had specifically authorized the locality to
define gambling. Modern federal decisions have allowed state regulations of interstate
commerce when expressly authorized by Congress. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
75. For example, a city might prove that frog gigging created a danger of injury
to other individuals.
76. See notes 64-65, supra, and accompanying text.
77. The Civil Code provides conflicting advice regarding the significance of a
statute's "spirit." Compare LA. CIVIL CODE art. 13 with LA. Civ. CODE art. 18. See
generally The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Local
Government Law, 38 LA. L. REv. 462, 473 n.70 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Local
Government Law].
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distorts any attempt to clarify this most confusing area of the
law, for it is virtually impossible to anticipate how the court
will apply a decision to other situations if one is unable to
discern the rationale of the decision to be applied.
The second reason that Curry's handling of the conflict
issue is disturbing is that it fails to acknowledge the linguistic
change introduced by the 1974 constitution. By citing pre-1974
conflict cases with apparent approval," the court seems to suggest that the standards for determining when a state law invalidates a local ordinance were left unchanged by the 1974 constitution. Not only does this suggestion ignore the new "not denied by" language of the 1974 constitution,7" it also ignores
Kaufman's implicit recognition that the "not denied by"
phrase establishes a different test than the "inconsistent with"
phrase that is used with respect to the relationship between the
state constitution and local powers. 0 It thus avoids a most
difficult issue, determining the precise meaning of the "not
denied by" phrase; but it avoids this issue only by disregarding
the apparent intent of the framers of the constitution to enhance local authority vis-a-vis the state.
Although the records of the constitutional convention offer
no precise definition of the "not denied by" language, several
factors indicate that the convention intended for the test to be
more protective of local power than the traditional conflict
rule. First, the committee version of article VI used the "not
denied by" language with respect to both the state constitution
and state statutes." A series of floor amendments inserted the
"inconsistent with" language to govern conflicts between the
constitution and local ordinances," and the debate on these
78. 357 So. 2d at 1080, citing National Food Stores of Louisiana, Inc. v. Cefalu,
280 So. 2d 903 (La. 1973); Broussard v. Ketchens, 231 La. 508, 91 So. 2d 775 (1956).
79. See notes 39-54, supra, and accompanying text.
80. See City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995, 997 (La. 1977) ("local
governments are authorized to exercise any power necessary . . . for local government-providing that such powers are not (a) inconsistent with the 1974 Constitution
or (b) denied them by general legislation" (emphasis in original)). Perhaps Kaufman
is more sensitive to the language of the 1974 constitution because the author of the
opinion, Mr. Justice Tate, was a delegate to the constitutional convention.
81. 12 RECORDS, supra note 49, at 105.
82. 7 REcoRDs, supra note 49, at 1365-66, 1373, 1409.
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amendments suggests that the delegates understood the constitutional test to be more restrictive of local power. 83 Second, in
the debate over attempts to amend the "not denied by" language of article VI, supporters of the amendments often referred to the phrase "not denied by" as requiring a specific or
affirmative legislative denial." Third, the convention rejected
an amendment that would have precluded local governments
' Fourth,
from exercising powers "preempted by general laws. "8
the "not denied by" language in article VI was apparently derived from the Model Constitutional Provision for Municipal
Home Rule, 8 ' and the comments to the model provision indicate that the language requires that the legislature "expressly
deny" a power to a local government. 7
Providing a precise definition for the phrase "not denied
by" is a difficult assignment. A number of problems surface
immediately. For example, can there ever be an implied denial
of a power to a local government? 8 If so, should the courts
83. Id. at 1409 (remarks of Delegate Kean). In an article written after the constitution was adopted, Mr. Kean argued that the language might be broad enough to
permit a finding of implied denial or preemption in certain cases. See Kean, supra note
49, at 70-71.
84. 7 RECORDS, supra note 49, at 1363, 1366-67, 1410-11 (remarks of Delegate
Jenkins); Id. at 1398-99 (remarks of Delegate Conroy).
85. Id. at 1410-12.
86. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL CONSTITUTONAL PROVISIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1953). According to a draft of the committee proposal, the

direct source for the section containing the phrase "not denied by" was the Model
State Constitution. That constitution lists the American Municipal Association's proposal as its

source.

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art.

VIII,

§ 8.02 (6th rev. ed. 1968). Moreover, a research memorandum prepared for the Committee on Local and Parochial Government quoted an article written by Jefferson
Fordham, the author of the American Municipal Association's home rule provision. 12
RECORDS, supra note 49, at 172, quoting Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 MUN.
REV. 140 (1955).
87. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 86, at 20 (words "not denied
by" mean "expressly limited"; locality can act so long as the state legislature does not
"expressly deny" a power).
88. In one case, the court is almost certain to find an implied denial-when the
local government attempts to contradict the express authorization of a statute. This
situation would have arisen in Curry if Shreveport had tried to permit frog gigging
during the months of April and May when the state prohibited it. The actual facts in
Curry are more difficult. There was no direct conflict between the language of the
statute, which prohibited frog gigging in April and May and authorized frogs to be
taken during the open season with certain mechanical gigging devices, and the local

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

imply the denial of a power to local governments on the basis
of the pervasive nature of the state's statutory scheme? 9 The
aim of the present discussion is not to provide a simple answer
to these problems, because no simple answer exists. Instead,
the foregoing comments attempt to demonstrate that uncritical
application of prior conflict decisions is unfaithful to the constitution's text, the debates of the convention, and the sources
of the constitutional language. Proper exercise of the judicial
function requires more: it requires the court to consider all
available sources to give a meaning to the new language that
is faithful to the text and realistic in light of the constitution's
approach to the power of local governments.
ANNEXATION

Louisiana's current annexation-by-ordinance provisions 0
ordinance, which allowed frog gigging only in June. To find an implicit denial of power
to the local government, the court must conclude (1) that the legislature meant to
authorize frog gigging from June to March (not just prohibit it in April and May and
regulate the types of devices that could be used during the open season) and (2) that
the legislature meant to deny local governments the power to prohibit frog gigging
during any portion of the period for which the state had authorized frog gigging.
89. Preemption may well be the most logical basis for the court's comments on
the conflict issue. Since the frog gigging section is part of a comprehensive statutory
scheme regulating fish and wildlife found in title 56 of the Revised Statutes, it may
be reasonable to assume that the legislature meant to exclude local ordinances changing the state rule. Curry, however, does not discuss the fact that the frog gigging
provision is merely one part of a comprehensive regulation of fish and wildlife.
90. Historically, Louisiana law has provided two general methods by which a
municipality may annex surrounding territory: by petition and election or by petition
and municipal ordinance. In addition, the legislature has established special rules for
Jefferson Parish, LA. R.S. 33:172.1 (Supp. 1966), and has forbidden New Orleans from
annexing any territory. LA. R.S. 33:171, 33:172(A) (1950 & Supp. 1972). Prior to
amendments by the legislature in 1972 La. Acts, No. 338, and 1976 La. Acts, No. 224,
the annexation by election provisions were found in LA. R.S. 33:151-60 (1950). When
one-third of the property owners (by number and value) in an area adjacent to the
municipality petitioned to be annexed, the governing authority of the municipality
could call an election in the area proposed for annexation. LA. R.S. 33:151 (1950). If a
majority (by both number and property value) of the electors in the area to be annexed
voted in favor of annexation, the municipality could then call an election within the
municipality. LA. R.S. 33:157 (1950). If a majority (by both number and property
value) of the voters in the city favored annexation, the municipal authorities would
issue a proclamation declaring the annexed area part of the municipality. LA. R.S.
33:160 (1950).
Alternatively, LA. R.S. 33:171-79 (1950) authorized a municipality to annex an
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permit a municipality to adopt an ordinance annexing contiguous areas9 into its boundaries in three situations:
1. When ninety percent of the boundary of the area
to be annexed is common to that of the municipality, the
municipality may act on its own initiative to take in the
territory by ordinance, although the action is subject to
judicial review as to whether it is reasonable and serves
the best interests of the overall community.2
2. If twenty-five percent of the resident property
owners in an area who also own twenty-five percent of the
adjacent area by municipal ordinance without calling an election when the municipality was presented with a petition signed by twenty-five percent of the resident property
owners in the area to be annexed and by owners of property equaling twenty-five
percent of the value of the property in the area. LA. R.S. 33:172 (1950). The ordinance
was not effective for 30 days after its publication, LA. R.S. 33:173 (1950), and during
that time any interested citizen of the municipality or the area to be annexed could
seek judicial review to determine the reasonableness of the proposed ordinance. LA.
R.S. 33:174 (1950).
The legislature in 1972 La. Acts, No. 338, and 1976 La. Acts, No. 224, amended
the annexation provisions to establish the annexation-by-ordinance rules discussed in
the text and to change the annexation-by-election rules for certain cities. The effect
of these changes was to dilute the distinction between the two methods by introducing
the element of an election into the annexation-by-ordinance provisions. Despite the
amendments, annexation by ordinance is still the more common procedure because the
requirements in that method are less onerous than in the annexation-by-election
method.
91. When the ordinance follows an election in the area to be annexed or when it
annexes an area that has ninety percent of its boundaries common with the city, the
statute requires that the territory annexed be contiguous to the municipality. LA. R.S.
33:172(C), (D) (Supp. 1972). An Attorney General's opinion has implied a similar
condition for other annexations based on the perception that the "legal idea of a
municipality is that of 'oneness' and that of a collective body, and not of several
bodies." 1944-46 LA. Op. ATr'y GEN. 503 (Feb. 27, 1946). See also 1946-48 LA. OP. ATT'y
GEN. 549 (June 17, 1947). Quaere whether the subsequent reenactment of section 172
with express requirements of contiguity in subsections B and D implies a legislative
intent that the requirement not apply to subsection A. LA. R.S. 33:172(C) (Supp.
1972).
92. The provision for judicial review in section 172(C) is broader than the general
review provision for annexation ordinances, which merely requires that the annexation
be reasonable. LA. R.S. 33:174 (1950). Section 172(C) expressly imposes on the city the
burden of proving that the ordinance is reasonable and that it serves the best interest
of the community. Under the section authorizing judicial scrutiny of other annexation
ordinances, LA. R.S. 33:174 (1950), the parties challenging the ordinance bear the
burden of proving unreasonableness. Kansas City So. Ry. v. City of Shreveport, 354
So. 2d 1362, 1369 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 103 (1978).
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value of all resident-owned property in the area petition a
municipality to call an annexation election, the municipality may call a special election in the affected area. If a
majority of those voting in the election favor annexation,
the city may then adopt an ordinance annexing the area."
3. The municipality may adopt an annexation ordinance without holding an election, if "prior to adoption"
of the ordinance, a majority of the registered voters in the
area to be annexed and a majority of the resident property
owners in the area who also own twenty-five percent of the
value of the resident-owned property in the area give their

"written assent" to the annexation.94

The first alternative listed above was apparently designed to
enable the city of Monroe to meet a particular problem,95 and
it does not appear to have been widely used. In all other
situations, the effect of the last two provisions is to require the
municipality to secure the approval of the voters in the area to
be annexed 7 as well as a substantial portion of the property
owners who reside in the area before it can adopt an annexation
ordinance.
Perhaps because it is less expensive to circulate petitions
than to hold a special election,9" the most common method of
93. LA. R.S. 33:172(D) (Supp. 1972).
94. LA. R.S. 33:172(A) (Supp. 1972).
95. See City of Monroe v. Noe, 340 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
96. The statute does not expressly limit its coverage to the city of Monroe, and
thus other municipalities might also find it useful. For example, if opposition to annexation were concentrated in one area, the city might use the other annexation-byordinance methods to annex the areas surrounding the site of the opposition and then
use section 172(C) to annex the area in which the opponents of annexation lived. Of
course, any annexation under section 172(C) is subject to judicial review to determine
if it is reasonable and serves the best interest of the overall community. See note 92,
supra, and accompanying text.
97. United States Supreme Court dictum suggests that a state may validly condition annexation on the approval by voters in the area to be annexed. See Lockport
v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 271 (1977). See generally Note, The
Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1571 (1975).
98. Section 172(D)'s procedure of securing petitions and then holding a special
election is less onerous in two respects. One need not secure approval of a majority of
the resident property owners, and one need only secure approval of a majority of those
actually voting in the special election rather than a majority of the registered voters.
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annexation is to secure a petition signed by a sufficiently large
number of voters and resident property owners to permit immediate annexation; this was the route followed by the supporters of annexation for the Cooper Road area of the northern
part of the city of Shreveport in the annexation that was the
subject of the supreme court's decision in Kansas City Southern Railway v. City of Shreveport." During the fall of 1976, a
group of residents in that area began circulating two types of
annexation petitions, one entitled "registered voters" and the
other entitled "property owners." Persons who fell within both
categories were asked to sign both petitions.
The city advertised that the petitions had been filed with
it in May 1977, and in October the city attorney certified that
a majority of the registered voters in the Cooper Road area had
signed the petitions. A month later, the parish assessor certified the property assessments of each of the owners signing the
petitions. Since the certifications indicated that the petitions
contained the requisite number of signatures, the city council
adopted the ordinance on first reading and scheduled a public
hearing. Opponents of annexation then sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the city from acting on the petitions.
After a hearing on the issue, the district court denied relief, but
it did allow some persons who had signed the petitions to withdraw their signatures.'" As -a-result of these withdrawals, the
number of signatures on the "registered voters" petition fell
below a majority. However, the city attorney determined that
a number of registered voters had signed only the "property
owners" petition, and the city counted these signatures with
the ones on the "voters" petition to secure the requisite majority of registered voters.
One hour before the public hearing was to begin, a number
of other persons who had signed the annexation petitions asked
that their names be withdrawn. Had these requests been
However, judging from the reported cases, these advantages do not seem to have
outweighed the considerable financial savings of the petition-and-ordinance procedure.
99. Kansas City So. Ry. v. City of Shreveport, 354 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 103 (1978).
100. The city had granted prior requests to withdraw signatures-including those
made at a judicial hearing a week earlier. Id. at 1366.
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granted, the petitions would not have satisfied the statutory
requirements because they would not have contained a majority of the resident property owners in the area to be annexed.' 0 '
The city, however, refused to honor the requests; instead, it
proceeded with the public hearing and passed the ordinance on
final reading.
Opponents of annexation challenged the annexation ordinance, contending that the petitions did not contain enough
signatures to permit the city to adopt the ordinance because
the withdrawal requests submitted on the day of the public
hearing should have been granted. They also argued that the
petitions were invalid because they were not signed by a majority of the registered voters in the area to be annexed. 10
The supreme court rejected both arguments.'0 The majority held that determining the validity of the withdrawal requests required a "balancing of conflicting interests, with due
regard for recognizing individual rights of . . . [those] op-

posed to annexation, while preserving the workability of the
annexation process."'' Judging the Shreveport annexation by
101. Id. If earlier withdrawals had reduced the percentage of signatures to less
than a majority, it is unclear whether the city could have relied on the petitions as
sufficient to authorize it to call a special election on the annexation question. To give
the city this discretion, one would have to conclude that the "written consent" of
section 172(A) is the substantial equivalent of the request for an annexation election
required in section 172(D). The question might have practical significance in a situation such as that involved in the text; although the percentage of property owners
dropped below a majority, the city apparently still had the approval of a majority of
the registered voters, the only persons entitled to participate in the special election.
See note 98, supra.
102. In addition to the arguments discussed in the text, the court also rejected
four other contentions advanced by the plaintiffs. The court held that the assessor's
certification was correctly limited to resident property owners, that the assessor's use
of 1976 assessment roles was reasonable since the certification process had begun
before the 1977 assessment roles were filed, that the annexation ordinance was reasonable, and that the preference for resident property owners was constitutional. 354 So.
2d at 1368-70. For a more detailed analysis of the constitutional issue, see notes 11820, infra.
103. 354 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 103 (1978). At the request
of the city, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted supervisory writs "in effect directing
that the appeal by plaintiffs by-pass the court of appeal." 354 So. 2d at 1366. The city
requested the expedited review because a special election on a proposed new city
charter was scheduled for May and the normal appeal process would not have been
completed by the date of the special election.
104. Id. at 1367.
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this standard, the majority concluded that the withdrawals on
the day of the public hearing "came too late," although it
refused to set "a specific deadline for withdrawals."'' 5 The majority emphasized the "considerable legislative and executive
time [that] must be expended" before the governing body can
be "adequately informed and prepared for the final vote on
adoption of the ordinance."'0 6 The public hearing in the
Shreveport case marked "the culmination, and not the beginning, of extensive municipal government activities and deliberations."'0 7 Moreover, the opponents of annexation had been
given an "ample amount of time" to secure withdrawals at an
earlier stage of the proceedings. 0 8 In light of these considerations, the majority reasoned that permitting these withdrawals
"would produce havoc and interfere unduly with the legislative
process in completing the annexation procedure."'' os
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id. Justice Summers dissented on the ground that the city should have
granted the withdrawal requests. Id. at 1371 (Summers, J., dissenting). He criticized
the majority opinion for ignoring the language of the statute and misapplying the
holding in Barbe v. City of Lake Charles, 216 La. 871, 45 So. 2d 62 (1950). He found a
right to withdraw "implicit in the statute because there is nothing in the law which
prevents a timely withdrawal." 354 So. 2d at 1371. In defining the time of withdrawal,
he relied heavily on the statutory phrase "prior to adoption." Since the statute permitted the city to enact an annexation ordinance only if it secured the written consent of
the resident property owners "prior to adoption" of the ordinance, he argued that the
withdrawals occurring before the city's final adoption of the ordinance destroyed the
statutory requirement of a petition signed by a majority of the resident property
owners. He also contended that the majority position was inconsistent with the Barbe
decision. Barbe, he argued, had "permitted withdrawal at any time prior to the hearing
required to be held prior to adoption" of an annexation ordinance. 354 So. 2d at 1371.
Since the Shreveport withdrawals occurred before the public hearing, they were timely
under the Barbe rule. Id.
The dissent's criticisms of the majority opinion distort both the clarity of the
statutory language and the holding of Barbe. The statute requires the municipality to
obtain the written assent of a majority of the registered voters "prior to adoption" of
the annexation ordinance. However, this language does not compel the conclusion that
the city must have the written assent at the time the ordinance is adopted. An equally
logical interpretation of the statute is that if the city obtains the written assent at any
point "prior to adoption," the statutory requirement has been satisfied. Judged by this
latter interpretation, Shreveport had satisfied the statute because it had obtained the
written assent of a majority of the registered voters at the time of the certification by
the city attorney.
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The court also approved the counting of the registered
voters who had signed only the "property owners" petition to
determine if the city had secured the "written assent" of a
majority of the registered voters in the area to be annexed. The
lack of a statutory requirement to divide "the petitions into two
categories" meant that no one had to sign a particular petition.
The use of two petitions merely served the purpose of
"convenience" and did not, therefore, "preclude consideration
of every registered voter who signed any petition."' 0
Although the majority reached a just result in the case
before it, its handling of the withdrawal issue fails to offer clear
guidance for the future. Barbe v. City of Lake Charles"' had
previously allowed a municipality to reject requests for withdrawals that came after the holding of a public hearing but
before the final vote on the annexation ordinance. In explaining
its decision, the Barbe court emphasized that "the [city]
council had jurisdiction, and had acted" prior to the submission of the requests for removal."' The Kansas City Southern
opinion commendably dropped the confusing references to the
3 but it failed to
"jurisdiction" of the city council in Barbe,"1
specify precisely the point at which the right to withdraw expires. Language in the opinion suggests that withdrawals are
untimely after the certifications of the signatures of the registered voters and resident property owners."' That language is
The dissent's assertion that Barbe permitted withdrawals prior to the public hearing is simply incorrect. Barbe held that withdrawals after the public hearing were
invalid; it did not address the issue of withdrawals prior to the public hearing. Although the Barbe decision is not entirely clear as to the rule it applied, the language
of the opinion suggests that the critical juncture is not the holding of the public hearing
but the initiation of the municipal action. See, e.g., Barbe v. City of Lake Charles,
216 La. 871, 891, 45 So. 2d 62, 69 (1950), where it is stated: "[Tihe petitions for
withdrawal, presented after the council had jurisdiction and had acted, came too late
.. .. (Emphasis added.)
110. 354 So. 2d at 1368.
111. 216 La. 871, 45 So. 2d 62 (1950).
112. Id. at 891, 45 So. 2d at 69.
113. For a criticism of Barbe's use of the term "jurisdiction," see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1950-1951 Term-Local Government Law, 11
LA. L. REv. 206, 210 (1951).

114. The court emphasized Barbe's concern with "the effect on this statute if
withdrawals were allowed to interfere with the legislative process, once begun .... "
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inconsistent, however, with the court's implicit approval of the
withdrawals permitted by the trial court during the two week
interval following the adoption of the ordinance on first reading
and the public hearing."' Moreover, the majority opinion emphasized the court's desire to follow the Barbe example in limiting its holding to the facts of the specific case before it."'
This failure to delineate the point at which withdrawals
are no longer permitted introduces an undesirable ambiguity
into a detailed statutory scheme. What if the withdrawal requests that reduce the majority to a minority come one day
prior to the public hearing? What if they come a week earlier?
What if they come immediately after the first reading or immediately before the first reading? The Kansas City Southern
opinion furnishes no sound basis for a city attorney or lower
court to resolve those questions. Although predictability may
not be the only goal of the law, it is surely an important one.
By failing to identify the precise basis of the Kansas City
Southern decision, the court has needlessly continued the uncertainty surrounding annexations in Louisiana.
The legislature should end this uncertainty by amending
the annexation statute to clarify the time at which the right of
withdrawal expires. In at least one other election statute, the
legislature has expressly made the reasonable choice of permitting withdrawals until the signatures are certified." 7 That ap354 So. 2d at 1367 (emphasis added). Later the opinion labelled the Shreveport'hearing
as the "culmination ...
of extensive municipal government activities and deliberations." Id. That "process," the majority declared, "was begun with the certified assent
of a majority of the registered voters and the resident property owners.
... Id.
(Emphasis added.)
115. Id. at 1366. Had the withdrawal requests at the preliminary injunction
hearing been untimely the court would not have had to consider the question of the
city's authority to count the signatures of registered voters who had signed only the
"property owners" petition. Until the district court allowed those withdrawals, the
"registered voters" petition contained signatures of a majority of the registered voters.
Id. at 1368.
116. Id. at 1367. The court stated: "In the present case we also hold that the
withdrawals came too late. Without delineating a specific deadline for withdrawals,
we reason that allowing withdrawals on the day of the final vote on adoption . . .
would interfere. . . unduly with the legislative process.
... Id. (Emphasis added.)
117. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 42:343(B) (Supp. 1978) (recall elections). See generally
Coleman v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). It is interesting to note that
this legislative action followed a judicial decision establishing a much less precise text
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proach establishes an easily identifiable point allowing an individual petitioner to reconsider his decision while the petitions
are still circulating, while recognizing the municipality's valid
interests once it has become extensively involved in the process.
Of course, any legislative tinkering with the annexation
statute should also consider the more fundamental question of
the possible constitutional infirmities of the Louisiana statutes. 8 Recent Supreme Court decisions have invalidated legislation restricting the franchise to property owners in elections
of general interest,"' and one federal court of appeals has held
unconstitutional a state annexation statute granting special
voting rights to property owners. 2 ' The rationale of those decifor withdrawals. See Hawthorne v. McKeithen, 216 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968)
(governor has discretion concerning removal of a name from recall petition).
118. Kansas City Southern raised the constitutional issue in an oblique fashion.
The railroad argued that the statutory provisions giving resident property owners in
the area greater rights than nonresident property owners deprived them of property
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the statutory scheme as "a valid
exercise of legislative power" because "the statute's requirement of reasonableness"
adequately protects the due process rights of property owners. 354 So. 2d at 1370. The
court continued by noting that Kansas City Southern's complaint was "perhaps more
properly considered in terms of denial of equal protection to nonresident property
owners because of unreasonable classification between property owners." Id. The
court, however, refused to find the statutory discrimination in favor of residents
"constitutionally offensive" because the preference for residents encompassed "only
the initiating of the annexation process" and not "the decision for approval or disapproval." Id.
In a footnote, the author of the Kansas City Southern opinion, Judge Lemmon of
the Fourth Circuit who was sitting as justice ad hoc, explained his personal view that
the statutory preference for residents "treat[ed] property owners unequally without
reasonable classification." Id. at 1370 n.12. Nonetheless, he concluded that the railroad's "exclusion by classification [was] not a denial of equal protection" because the
statutory provision that allows property owners "to defeat annexation which is otherwise reasonable" was itself unconstitutional. Id., citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969). See note 121, infra.
119. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). When
landowners have a "special interest" in the election, a state can constitutionally limit
the franchise to property owners. See also Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
120. Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 363 (1978).
The South Carolina statute invalidated in Hayward is similar to Louisiana's
annexation-by-election procedure. For a description of the Louisiana statute, see note
90, supra.

19791

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978

869

sions would appear to proscribe the Louisiana requirements
that a certain percentage of resident property owners sign the
petition initiating the annexation proceeding. 2 '
TORT LIABILrrY

Enforcement of Judgments
Notwithstanding the abolition of governmental tort immunity in the 1974 constitution, 2 confusion continues to
121. But see Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978) (South Carolina
statute authorizing a city to annex by ordinance when presented with a petition signed
by seventy-five percentlor more of the freeholders in the area is constitutional).
The most obvious characteristic distinguishing the Louisiana statute from the
situations described in the text accompanying notes 119-20, supra, is that it involves
a petition and not an election. However, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hayward v.
Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978), emphasizes that the decisive factor is not the form
of the statute but its substance. Hayward invalidated a statutory requirement that a
majority of the property owners approve the annexation before the annexation was
submitted to the voters in an election. The statute was unconstitutional, the court
ruled, because its effect was to grant "to some individuals-who are identified on the
basis of ownership of realty-the right to nullify a vote for annexation by the electorate
at large." Id. at 189. This emphasis on the substance of the statutory scheme indicates
that the Louisiana statute may also be unconstitutional because its effect is similar to
the South Carolina provision invalidated in Hayward: it permits property owners to
stop the electorate at large from completing an annexation. Note, however, that in
Berry the Fourth Circuit refused to extend Hayward to invalidate a requirement that
annexation be initiated by a super majority of property owners.
One might argue that the Louisiana statute is distinguishable on still another
ground. Because section 172(D) allows the registered voters an alternate avenue to
overcome the opposition of property owners, one might argue that section 172(A)
simply provides a less expensive alternative when all those living in the area to be
annexed favor annexation. However, this position fails to recognize that section 172(D)
itself gives resident property owners a favored position by allowing them to defeat
annexation if they oppose annexation by a super majority, i.e., if more than seventyfive percent of the resident property owners or if owners of more than seventy-five
percent of the value of all property owned by resident property owners oppose annexation. Cf. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975), where it is stated: "[Ajs long as the
election in question is not one of special interest, any classification restricting the
franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless
the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state
interest." (Emphasis added.)
122. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. See generally Local Government Law, supra note
77, at 474 n.73. In a decision rendered after this article was written, the supreme court
held that the constitutional waiver of immunity invalidates the statute exempting
state and local governments from the payment of most court costs. Segura v. Louisiana
Architects Selections Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978), rev'g 353 So. 2d 330 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977).
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shroud the question of whether successful tort litigants can
force local governmental entities to pay judgments. In
Fontenot v. State Department of Highways 23 the successful
plaintiff in a tort action against the Ascension Parish Police
Jury obtained a district court order requiring the police jury to
submit to a judgment debtor examination. On application of
the police jury, the First Circuit required the district judge to
recall his order. Beginning with the premise that the examination could be required only in aid of execution of a judgment,' 24
the appellate court rejected both methods that Fontenot
suggested he might use to enforce his judgment. First, relyon Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Police Jury,'2 5 the court
ruled that Fontenot could not seize police jury property to satisfy his judgment. Second, the court considered the possible
availability of mandamus to compel payment. Without citing
any specific cases, the court concluded that mandamus was not
available because "[t]he appropriation of funds by a legislative body has been almost universally held to be discretionary,
not ministerial.' '2 Since the court rejected both suggested ave123. 358 So. 2d 981 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978). For
the appeal on the merits of Fontenot's claim, see Fontenot v. State Dep't of Highways, 346 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977). The supreme court opinion was printed
prior to the appellate court opinion. Furthermore, the reference to 346 So. 2d 849 in
the supreme court opinion is an error. The citation in the supreme court opinion of
the lower court decision is to the decision on the Merits and not the judgment debtor
examination at issue. The appropriate cite should be 358 So. 2d 981.
124. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2451.
125. 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976).
126. 358 So. 2d at 982. See also Local Government Law, supra note 77, at 475
n.76. The court may have overestimated the universality of the holdings that appropriation is a discretionary act. As one of my students, Mr. Peter Meisner, brought to my
attention, both the supreme court and the First Circuit have denied mandamus relief
based on the principle that "a want of funds is a complete answer to a petition for
mandamus." State ex rel. Ascension Red Cypress Co. v. New River Drainage, 148 La.
603, 605, 87 So. 310, 310 (1921); Delaune v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 264
So. 2d 672, 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). Those decisions would not appear to preclude
mandamus if a judgment debtor examination revealed that a local government had
sufficient funds to pay the judgment. Cf. Penny v. Bowden, 199 So. 2d 345 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967) (city ordered to fund police pension fund as required by state statute).
One should also note that other jurisdictions have been willing to mandamus appropriations in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Tate v. Antosh, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 144,
281 A.2d 192 (1971) (city ordered to appropriate sufficient funds to implement arbitration decisions).
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nues of execution, it held that the "police jury should not be
required to submit to a judgment debtor rule."' 27
In a brief per curiam order, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the district court's order, but it disclaimed any intention to determine if the plaintiff had the right
to execute his judgment by seizure or mandamus. 28 The exact
meaning of the court's order is difficult to decipher. Although
the order counsels against any assumption that it was considering any issue but that of the judgment debtor examination, it
is difficult to see why the court would order the examination if
it could provide no practical benefit for the plaintiff. Perhaps
the most logical appraisal of the court's opinion is that it continues to give the legislature the opportunity to enact a statute
requiring local governments to pay judgment creditors, but at
the same time it hints that Foreman may not be the last word
29
if the legislature fails to act.
Identification of the Responsible Governmental Entity
Last year's symposium noted the conflicting approaches
that Louisiana courts have used in identifying the governmental entity that is responsible for the torts of public officers who
serve local governments. 30 The problem surfaced again this
year in Foster v. Hampton 3' where the precise issue was who
is liable for the negligent acts of a deputy sheriff.
American law has traditionally regarded the sheriff's position as a personal office rather than as a governmental body. 2
127. 358 So. 2d at 982.
128. 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978).
129. The supreme court will apparently not have to decide the unresolved issues
in Fontenot. In the 1978 legislative session, attorneys for Fontenot tried to have the
legislature force Ascension Parish to pay the judgment. The Senate eventually rejected
the plaintiff's request, but only after Senator Sevario, representing Ascension Parish,
assured his colleagues that the police jury would pay the judgment. See Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate, July 8, 1978, § A, at 15; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 7,
1978, § C, at 7.
130. Local Government Law, supra note 77, at 476-80.
131. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977). See also LeJeune v. Allstate, Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d
537 (La. App. 3d Cir.), amended and remanded, 365 So.2d 471 (La. 1979); Michel v.
Hometown Super Markets, Inc., 352 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
132. See generally 1 W. ANDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS, AND CONSTABLES WITH FORMS §§ 6, 20, 42-44 (1941); W. HARLOW, DUTIES OF
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One consequence of that conception has been that in Louisiana, as well as in other American jurisdictions, the defense of
governmental immunity from tort liability has not applied to
the sheriff.' = As early as 1872, a Louisiana court imposed personal liability on a sheriff for the wrongful actions of his deputy,

34

and a 1940 statute codified this jurisprudential rule. 13

The sheriffs liability was not unlimited, however. Before and
after the statutory imposition of liability, the Louisiana courts
limited the sheriff's liability to acts committed by a deputy
while
performing an official duty or acting in an official capacity. 136 The legislature further limited the sheriff's personal liability in a 1950 amendment to the statutory provisions making
the sheriff responsible for his deputies. The amendment required all deputy sheriffs to post a $5000 bond "for the faithful
performance of their duties,'

' 37

and it limited the sheriff's lia-

bility for the acts of his deputy to the amount of the bond
except when the "deputy sheriff, in the commission of the said
act or tort, acts in compliance with a direct order of, and in the
personal presence8 of, the said sheriff, at the time the act or tort
is committed.'

'3

SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES §§

1-3 (3d rev. ed. 1907). A recent decision of the Third

Circuit confirms that Louisiana law does not treat the sheriff's office as a governmental
body. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriffs Dep't, 350 So. 2d 236, 239
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) ("The 'Parish Sheriffs Department' is not a legal entity
capable of suing and being sued.").
133. See Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197, 202 (La. 1977).
134. Frazier v. Parsons, 24 La. Ann. 339 (1872).
135. 1940 La. Acts., Ex. Sess., No. 8, § 1. The 1870 Code of Practice also contained a provision making the sheriff responsible for the acts of his deputy. La. Code
of Practice art. 764 (1870). See Sanders v. Humphries, 143 La. 43, 78 So. 168 (1918);
McVea v. Day, 6 La. App. 382 (1st Cir. 1927). In 1934 the legislature repealed that
section. 1934 La. Acts, 3d Ex. Sess., No. 27, § 2. But even after the repeal, the supreme
court ruled that a sheriff remained liable for his deputy's violation of, or failure to
perform, an official duty. Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939).
136. See, e.g., Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939); Sanders v.
Humphries, 143 La. 43, 78 So. 168 (1918); Nielson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office,
242 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
137. 1950 La. Acts, No. 426, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433 (1950). A 1968
amendment to section 1433 permits the deputy to furnish a certificate of public liability insurance in lieu of the bond. 1968 La. Acts, No. 45, § 1. A 1978 amendment to the
section requires deputies in Orleans Parish to furnish a $200 bond "in the same form
and manner required of deputies in the other parishes." 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, § 1.
138. 1950 La. Acts, No. 426, § 1. For the version of the statute containing the
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In Fosterthe plaintiff alleged that a deputy sheriff in East
Baton Rouge Parish injured him when the deputy made an
illegal left turn. He further alleged that, at the time of the
accident, the deputy was driving a vehicle belonging to the
sheriff's department and was "acting in his official capacity.' 139
He joined both the deputy and the sheriff as defendants, but
the district court granted the sheriff's exception of no cause of
action and dismissed the action against him."' Foster then
amended his petition to join the parish as a defendant, but the
court also dismissed the claim against the parish on an exception of no cause of action.'
The First Circuit sustained the decisions of the trial
court,' and the supreme court granted Foster's application for
a writ of review.4 3 On the merits, the supreme court also affirmed the trial court's dismissals of the sheriff and the parish,
but, in dictum, the court strongly suggested that the state was
the proper governmental defendant."' Mr. Justice Dixon's majority opinion first analyzed the question of the sheriff's liability and concluded that both the judicial limitation of liability
to official acts and the statutory provision limiting liability to
the sheriff's bond protected the sheriff with respect to Foster's
claim. Recognizing that the jurisprudential rule had "its genesis in the common law rather than Louisiana statutory law,"'4
he nevertheless confirmed its continuing validity; he specifically cited with approval prior decisions holding that the sheriff
is not responsible for his deputy's negligent operation of a
motor vehicle because the driving of an automobile is not an
"official" act of the deputy." 6 In addition, the majority opinion
amendments discussed in note 137, supra, but not the 1978 amendments, see LA. R.S.
33:1433 (1950 & Supp. 1968) (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, § 1).
139. Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197, 199 (La. 1977).
140. Id. Foster also joined the liability insurer who insured both the deputy and
the sheriff.
141. Id. Foster also joined the parish's liability insurer. After dismissing the
parish, the court also dismissed its insurer.
142. 343 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
143. 345 So. 2d 906 (La. 1977).
144. 352 So. 2d 197,.201-02 (La. 1977).
145. Id. at 200. See generally W. ANDERSON, supra note 132, §§ 60-63; W.
HARLOW, supra note 132, § 17.
146. 352 So. 2d at 200-01, citing Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722
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held that the sheriff was protected from personal liability even
if the deputy's actions involved an official act because the statute limited his liability to the amount of the deputy's bond
except when the deputy was complying with a direct order of,
and was acting in the personal presence of, the sheriff. Since
Foster had not alleged that the deputy's actions satisfied the
requirements of the exception, "the sheriff [could not] be held
liable under the [statutory] provisions."' 47 Justice Dixon also
rejected Foster's argument that the statutory limitation of liability established an immunity for sheriffs that could not survive the abolition of governmental immunity in the 1974 constitution. He held that the statutory provisions only limit the
personal liability of the sheriff and do not, therefore, involve
the question of governmental immunity.'48
The supreme court next considered. Foster's contention
that the parish was liable for the actions of the deputy sheriff.
Adopting the opinion of the First Circuit on this point, the
court specifically rejected Foster's "argument that deputy
sheriffs must be considered civil service employees of the cityparish government in East Baton Rough Parish" as having "no
support in the law."' 4 Under the "unique metropolitan form"
of the city-parish,'50 the sheriff's office is entirely separate from
(1939), and Nielson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 242 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970). The issue of a sheriff's liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
has arisen frequently in American jurisdictions, but the decisions display no clear
pattern of uniformity. Most cases have protected the sheriff from liability. See, e.g.,
Waters v. McClary, 344 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying Tennessee law); Usrey v.
Yarnell, 181 Ark. 804, 27 S.W.2d 988 (1930); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Clark, 136 Tex.
238, 150 S.W.2d 78 (1941). A few decisions have permitted recovery when the defendants were responding to emergency calls or transporting prisoners. See Duran v.
Mission Mortuary, 174 Kan. 565, 258 P.2d 241 (1953); Poole v. Brunt, 338 So. 2d 991
(Miss. 1976); Hanratty v. Godfrey, 44 Ohio App. 360, 184 N.E. 842 (Ct. App. 1932).
In New York, the critical distinction in determining liability is whether the deputy was
performing a civil or a criminal function. See Reck v. County of Onondaga, 61 Misc.
2d 259, 273 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
147. 352 So. 2d at 201.
148. Id. at 202. The court stated that "the principle that a sheriff is liable only
for the official acts of his deputy is subscribed to in jurisdictions throughout the
country and nowhere is the theory of sovereign immunity relied upon in protecting the
sheriff from liability." Id.
149. Id. at 203.
150. See LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, § 3(a).
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the metropolitan government. Since the city-parish exercises
no power over the office, it is not liable for the actions of the
sheriff's deputies. 5 '
The supreme court recognized that its decision appeared
to deny Foster a responsible governmental defendant but suggested that the plaintiff himself had created this appearance
by failing to sue the appropriate governmental defendant-the
state. After rejecting the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to the sheriff because "the relationship between
the sheriff and his deputy is not one of master and servant or
principal and agent," the court termed it "well settled that the
deputy sheriff is an officer of the state."'52 Accordingly, the
court volunteered, the "doctrine of respondeat superior might
be available to hold the State vicariously liable for the negligent torts of its employee in the course and scope of his employment." 3 Perhaps to reinforce the point, the court added a
footnote reference to the procedure required in suits against the
state. 54 Moreover, the court also bottomed its rejection of Foster's due process challenge to the statutory limitation on the
conclusion that "Foster has a remedy against the deputy sheriff
and may further be able to recover against the State, the proper
party to sue as 'employer' of [the deputy].' '55
Judged by the principles on which a fault system of tort
liability is based, the supreme court's decision is difficult to
justify. One of the fundamental assumptions of such a system
is that the tortfeasor could have avoided the accident if he had
acted in a reasonable manner. A logical corollary of this principle would seem to be that the law should impose liability on
individuals and entities capable of controlling the tortfeasor. In
the case of the negligent deputy, the sheriff's office that hires,
151. 352 So. 2d at 203.
152. Id. at 201.
153. Id. at 201-02.
154. Id. at 202 n.7.
155. Id. at 202. Foster took the court's suggestion and sued the state. That suit
is now pending in the Nineteenth Judicial District. The supreme court also rejected

Foster's claim that the statutory limitation violated his constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws. Because the statute "applies to all persons in the same circumstances and conditions in a like fashion," the supreme court found that "the requirements of equal protection are met." Id.
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fires, and supervises the deputy would be a more natural entity
to bear liability than the state or parish, neither of which exercises any significant control over him.
Foster, however, must be viewed in the context of the
Louisiana legal environment at the time the decision was rendered. Initially, one is faced with the fact that Louisiana law
did not recognize the most logical defendant, the sheriff's office, as a governmental entity capable of being sued.' Therefore, one had to look elsewhere for a defendant, and imposing
liability on either of the other two potential defendants at the
local level-the sheriff and the parish-appeared most unfair.
The plaintiff would have faced a most unsatisfactory guarantee
of a remedy if allowed to recover only against the sheriff; because of the statutory limitation of liability,'57 he would have
been limited to a $5000 bond and the personal assets of the
deputy sheriff. As for the parish, subjecting it to liability would
have required it to assume liability for the subordinates of an
officer that is far more independent of parish control than are
58
most other officials for whom it must accept responsibility.
Not only is the sheriff an elected official, 59 but the constitution
156. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 350 So. 2d 236, 23839 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). See note 132, supra, and accompanying text.
157. LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1978). See notes 15-16, supra, and accompanying
text. The statutory limitation of liability was permissible because it affected the sheriff's personal liability and did not establish an immunity for any governmental defendant. One could make a strong argument that by eliminating the exceptions that the
judiciary and the legislature have placed on a sheriff's liability for the acts of his
deputy would treat the sheriff most unfairly. Other governmental officials are not
normally forced to assume a similar liability for their subordinates. For example, a
police chief is not personally liable for the negligence of his officers; he is personally
liable only if he has committed a tort himself. But see LA. R.S. 33:1552 (Supp. 1952)
(coroner responsible for the "acts" of his deputy); LA. R.S. 47:1902 (1950) (assessor
responsible for the "acts" of his deputy).
158. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976) (town liable
for actions of elected town marshal); Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1974) (city liable for the tortious conduct of its police officers who were
acting under the orders of the city's elected mayor). But cf. Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (parish not liable for tort of clerk of city court
even though parish pays half of the clerk's salary). See generally Local Government
Law, supra note 77, at 474-80. Although Foster manifests no desire on the part of the
supreme court to overrule these decisions, it does suggest that the state might also be
liable for the actions of an individual such as a town marshal who qualifies as a state
official even though he serves a local government.
159. LA. CONST. art. V, § 27 (all parishes except Orleans). The legislature has
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specifically immunizes him from the control of the general governing body of the parish6 0 and state legislation guarantees
him a source of revenue for his duties.' In light of these considerations, the court's decision appears to be a reasonable one.
Since the state created the constitutional and statutory framework that precluded imposition of liability on the logical party
according to tort principles, it is just to require the state itself
to assume liability.
The legislature recognized the significance of Foster, especially the possibility that it might be extended to other constitutional offices' and the employees of those offices.' Act 318
of the 1978 session attempts to overrule the court's holding in
Fosterby eliminating the statutory provision restricting a sheriff's liability to his deputy's bond6 4 and by adding a new section to title 42 of the Revised Statutes that relieves the state
of liability "for any damage caused by a district attorney, coroner, assessor, sheriff, clerk of court, or public officer of a political subdivision within the course and scope of his official duties, or damage caused by [their employees]."'6 5 Unfortunately, the legislative response suffers from two defects: it does
greater power to alter the Orleans system, which provides for separate civil and criminal sheriffs. LA. CONST. art. V, § 32. For an excellent general discussion of the constitutional provisions relating to sheriffs, see Hargrave, The JudiciaryArticle of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. Rav. 765, 839-43 (1977).
160. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(G) (no home rule charter can contain any
provision affecting the sheriff's office that is inconsistent with the constitution).
161. LA. R.S. 33:1423, 33:1428 (Supp. 1978); 33:1432 (Supp. 1976) (fees due
sheriff as tax collector and in civil and criminal matters). The constitution grants him
the right to collect state and parish ad valorem taxes, but it does not specify the fee
he is to receive. LA. CONST. art. V, § 27.
162. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 26 (district attorneys); LA. CONST. art. V, §
28 (clerks of court); LA. CONST. art. V, § 29 (coroners); LA. R.S. 47:1901 (1970) (assessors). See also Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (clerk
of city court a state official); note 158, supra. Like sheriffs, these officials are immune
from having their positions altered by the local governing bodies. LA. CONsT. art. VI,
§ 5(G).
163. Sheriffs, as well as district attorneys, clerks of court, coroners, and assessors,
have the authority to appoint numerous subordinates. See LA. R.S. 16:6 (Supp. 1973);
33:1552 (Supp. 1952); 47:1902 (1950); 47:1908 (Supp. 1978); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 255.
The rationale of Foster suggests that the state may also be the governmental entity
that must assume liability for their torts as well.
164. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1972).
165. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, § 2, adding LA. R.S. 42:1441.
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not impose liability on the sheriff for the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle by his deputy, and its provision with respect
to state liability is probably unconstitutional. Although the
legislation eliminates the statutory basis for relieving the sheriff of personal liability, it does nothing with respect to the
court's alternate basis for its holding-the prior decisions establishing that the negligent operation of an official vehicle by
a deputy is not an "official act" for which the sheriff is liable.'
Not only does the 1978 act fail to impose liability on the sheriff,
but its attempt to limit the state's liability appears to fly in the
face of the 1974 constitution's abolition of governmental immunity. Even if the sheriff were rendered liable, the plaintiff
would still lack a governmental defendant to assume liability
for the deputy's conduct because the sheriffs liability is personal and does not affect a governmental entity. 7
The legislature could, however, achieve its goal by adopting a slightly different approach." 8 Instead of merely removing
the statutory provision limiting the sheriff's liability to his deputy's bond, the legislature could overrule the "official act" doctrine of the courts and expressly impose liability on the constitutional officers for all torts committed by a deputy or other
subordinate in the course and scope of his employment.' To
protect the officer from any personal exposure, the legislature
could also authorize him to purchase liability insurance to
cover the torts of his deputies and employees 7 ' and limit his
166. See notes 136, 146, supra, and accompanying text.
167. See notes 133, 148, supra, and accompanying text.
168. The most obvious approach to the problem would be to define the sheriff's
"office" as a governmental entity capable of suing and being sued. The indirect approach suggested in the text seems preferable, however, to avoid the argument that
such a legislative definition would conflict with the constitution's definition of a political subdivision. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(2); note 132, supra, and accompanying
text.
169. The courts have not ruled that the "official act" doctrine protects other
constitutional officers from liability for the acts of their deputies, but the arguments
favoring the doctrine with respect to sheriffs would seem equally applicable to other
officers.
170. Louisiana law already specifically authorizes a sheriff to purchase liability
insurance "to cover loss or damage from any negligent acts of the sheriff or his deputies, in the performance of the duties of his office .
LA. R.S. 33:1450.1 (Supp.
1977).
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liability for the acts of his subordinates to a certain amount if
he carries liability insurance in that amount. Finally, by exercising its constitutional power to provide for the "effect of a
judgment" against a governmental defendant,' the legislature
could permit recovery against the state only for amounts that
the plaintiff was unable to recover from the officer or his insurer. This approach would offer the plaintiff a solvent defendant and force the office that employs and controls the tortfeasor to bear the cost of damages caused by his actions. At the
same time, it would enable the officer to avoid personal loss for
the negligence of a subordinate, and it would limit the state's
liability to that of an excess coverage insurer in situations
where the plaintiff's damages exceed the amount of insurance
that the officer is required to carry to avoid personal liability.
171.

LA. CONST. art. XII,

§ 10(c).

